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Does the FTC Have Blood On Its Hands?
An Analysis of FTC Overreach and Abuse of
Power After Liu
ANGEL REYES AND BENJAMIN HUNTER†
Recent cases have called the Federal Trade
Commission’s (“FTC”) enforcement methods into question.
After a circuit split developed in the wake of the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Credit
Bureau Center, L.L.C., the Supreme Court responded by
granting certiorari and consolidating the case with AMG
Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Federal Trade Commission.
The issue in these cases is whether Section 13(b) of the FTC
Act authorizes the FTC to bypass the due process safeguards
mandated by Congress in Sections 5 and 19 of the FTC Act
and, in doing so, to conduct warrantless searches and
seizures, unilaterally freeze assets, and impose punitive
“disgorgement” monetary damages. In light of the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Liu, it seems likely that the Court will limit the FTC’s
abusive use of Section 13(b) and find in favor of the
defendants in these cases.
The FTC’s mission is to protect consumers from unfair

†Angel Reyes is a 1991 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School. He
also holds an MBA from Texas Tech University. He can be reached at
angel@reyeslaw.com. Benjamin Hunter is a third-year law student at University
of Michigan Law School. He can be reached at benhunt@umich.edu.
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or deceptive acts or practices, and for many years, one of its
main enforcement methods has been disgorgement under
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. Section 13(b) gives the FTC the
authority to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions
when it believes that the law is being violated or is about to
be violated. It does not mention disgorgement or any other
restitution methods, but the FTC has spent considerable
time and energy building a foundation of favorable case law
to support its ability to use disgorgement. Its strategy
consisted of building a body of precedent, based on old and
inapplicable cases, and it has aggressively pursued this
strategy with the intention of expanding its enforcement
abilities. The way it has used its self-created power has
caused untold damage to business owners, employees, and
consumers.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should rule
against the FTC in Credit Bureau Center/AMG Capital
Management. The FTC used shaky and extraneous case law
to expand its power to include the ability to seek
disgorgement, and it has caused irreparable harm to
businesses and individuals across the country. Indeed,
following the FTC’s use of disgorgement as an improper
remedy to seek damages, several business owners who were
subjected to that improper treatment committed suicide,
making the FTC a de facto judge, jury, and executioner. Part
I details the methods that the FTC has used over the past
few decades to expand its power to its current level. Part II
argues that disgorgement is not authorized by Congress
under Section 13(b). Indeed, nothing other than a
preliminary or permanent injunction is authorized by
Congress under Section 13(b). And Part III addresses the
numerous constitutional issues that arise when a federal
agency expands its power far beyond its statutory grant of
power.
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INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The first indication that the FTC’s enforcement methods
would be receiving a more robust examination came in
Kokesh v. Securities & Exchange Commission, when the
Supreme Court ruled that the remedy of disgorgement
operates as a “penalty,” rendering it subject to a five-year
statute of limitations.1 The case included a footnote that
many believed opened the door for a challenge to the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) right to seek
disgorgement at all. The footnote stated that nothing in the
decision “should be interpreted as an opinion on whether
courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly
applied disgorgement principles in this context.”2 Many legal
commentators believed that meant the court was ready to
hear a case on the practice of disgorgement as a whole. This
case was relevant to the FTC because it uses the same
disgorgement practices that the SEC does, and it signaled
that big changes might be coming for the FTC.
Two cases had worked their way through circuit courts
that seemed ripe for review by the Supreme Court. The FTC’s
position on disgorgement was weakened by a Seventh Circuit
case, the result of which created an eight-to-one circuit split.3
In that case, Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau
Center, L.L.C., the court held that the FTC does not have
authority to seek restitution under Section 13(b) because its
plain terms provide solely for injunctive relief.4 On the other
1. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1645 (2017).
2. Id. at n.3.
3. See Recent Case, Statutory Interpretation—Stare Decisis—Seventh
Circuit Uses Methodological Stare Decisis to Reverse Substantive Precedent—FTC
v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1444, 1444 (2020). The FTC’s
Section 13(b) power was also questioned in Federal Trade Commission v. Shire
ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019), but the Third Circuit court did not go
as far as the court in Credit Bureau Center. The court in Shire ViroPharma held
that Section 13(b) only applies to ongoing or imminent harms. See id. at 155.
4. 937 F.3d 764, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2019).
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hand, in Federal Trade Commission v. AMG Capital
Management, L.L.C., the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court had the power to order “equitable monetary relief” or
restitution, and that that power stemmed from the FTC’s
power to seek injunctions against businesses.5 Now that the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on these cases, it
should radically restrict the FTC’s power under Section 13(b)
to seek disgorgement or any remedies other than the
injunctive relief specifically authorized by Congress.
After the ruling in Kokesh, a case came out of the Ninth
Circuit that challenged the SEC’s right to seek
disgorgement. The Supreme Court took the case, and in Liu
v. Securities & Exchange Commission the court held that
disgorgement awards in SEC enforcement actions may not
exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits.6 This was a major blow to
the SEC’s enforcement scheme because it limits the amount
of restitution it is able to seek and underscores that the Court
will no longer allow federal agencies to expand their powers
beyond those specifically granted by Congress.
These cases constitute the legal background of the FTC’s
current predicament on disgorgement. Now that the
Supreme Court has taken Credit Bureau Center and AMG
Capital Management, it has the perfect opportunity to
remedy the issue of the FTC’s massively expanded power. A
ruling against the FTC in these cases would bring its power
back in line with what Congress intended. Because the FTC
has been relying on weak caselaw since it first began the
process of expanding its power, there is strong legal support
for such a decision. The Supreme Court should continue
down the path it followed in Liu and trim the FTC’s power
back to a more appropriate level.

5. 910 F.3d 417, 426–27 (9th Cir. 2018).
6. 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020).
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THE FTC’S POWER GRAB

A. The FTC Worked to Remove Limitations on Its Power
The FTC began to expand its power after two “provisos”
were added to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1973.7
The first proviso gave the FTC the ability to seek preliminary
injunctions, and the second gave it the ability to seek
permanent injunctions.8 The FTC then embarked on a
decades-long campaign to transform this seemingly limited
set of powers into an arsenal of enforcement methods,
including disgorgement and other types of restitution, that
the FTC continues to use to this day. Before Congress or the
public realized what was going on, the FTC had gained an
enormous amount of power, the legal basis of which was
shaky at best. The FTC weaponized Section 13(b) to allow it
to storm into businesses without due process and use all
kinds of enforcement methods without having a statutory
basis for doing so. This accretion of power is in violation of
standard principles of statutory interpretation, contradicts
current caselaw, and was done to make it easier for the FTC
to enforce the law how it wanted the law to be interpreted
with a minimum amount of oversight.
The FTC has essentially admitted that it relies on
Section 13(b) because it makes it easier for the FTC to win
cases with less oversight or due process rights for
defendants. The other enforcement sections that the FTC can
use, Sections 5 and 19, have many more procedural obstacles
that the FTC would have to contend with if it were to use
them in enforcement cases.9 According to the FTC, the
problem with Section 19 is that “[y]ou need[] three separate

7. See Robert D. Paul, The FTC’s Increased Reliance on Section 13(b) in
Court Litigation, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 141, 141–42 (1988); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b)(2) (2018).
8. See Paul, supra note 7.
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (2018).
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lawsuits to get final relief.”10 Additionally, Section 19
enforcement actions are subject to a three-year statute of
limitations.11 That proved to be inconvenient for the FTC,
and so it began to rely more on Section 13(b), which meant it
could accomplish the same goals in one lawsuit. On its own
website, it stated that “Section 13(b) is preferable to the
adjudicatory process because, in such a suit, the court may
award both prohibitory and monetary equitable relief in one
step.”12 These statements, and the litigation strategy that
the FTC has pursued, show an undesirable and unacceptable
pattern of trying to skirt due process and change the law to
favor its battering ram tactics.
Using Section 13(b) over Section 19 provides the FTC
with another advantage. Under Section 13(b), defendants are
not entitled to jury trials because the FTC seeks equitable
remedies instead of legal remedies.13 This takes away an
important right for defendants and is another example of the
FTC using certain enforcement methods to makes things
easier on itself, causing great harm to those whom the
agency sets its sights on.
Federal agencies should not make it their mission to
expand their power as much as possible. Instead, they should
focus on fairness and doing the mission that they were
created to do. The FTC was granted the power, under Section
10. Brief for Publishers Bus. Servs., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, Publishers Bus. Servs. Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 540 F. App’x
555 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 19-507 & 19-508) (quoting David M. FitzGerald,
Remarks at the FTC 90th Anniversary Symposium: Session on “Injunctions,
Divestiture and Disgorgement” (Sept. 23, 2004) (transcript available at
http://bit.ly/2kW0VWS)).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(d) (2018).
12. Fed. Trade Comm’n, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FTC.GOV (July 2008),
http://ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://web.archive.
org/web/20190301021249/https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement
-authority].
13. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ELH Consulting, L.L.C., No. CV 12–02246–
PHX–FJM, 2013 WL 593885, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2013) (holding that there is
no right to a jury for equitable claims).
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13(b), to ask courts for injunctions. What it has done is go far
beyond that to help ensure that any business it targets has
less tools to defend itself.
B. The FTC’s Reliance on Porter and Mitchell
The FTC embarked on a legal strategy, starting in the
1980s, to reconstruct the FTC Act in its favor. The first step
that the FTC took was building up a body of favorable
caselaw. The main cases that the FTC relied on to begin
building up favorable precedent were Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.14 and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.15
In Porter, the Court gave the Price Controls Board wide
authority to use equitable remedies such as disgorgement of
profits in its enforcement actions.16 That authority stemmed
from the statute that granted the Price Controls Board its
power, which stated that in Price Controls Board cases,
courts could grant “a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order.”17 The Court in Porter also
stated that when Congress gives federal district courts
equitable jurisdiction, that comes with the “power to decide
all relevant matters in dispute and to award complete relief
even though the decree includes that which might be
conferred by a court of law.”18 In Mitchell, the Court affirmed
Porter’s holding that “the comprehensiveness of th[e]
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the
absence of a clear and valid legislative command.”19 These
cases’ expansive views of the equitable remedies allowable
under certain statutes proved to be all that the FTC needed
to start building a foundation of precedent that it relies on to
this day.
14. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
15. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
16. See 328 U.S. at 398–99.
17. Id. at 399.
18. Id.
19. 361 U.S. at 291 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).
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The FTC relied on Porter in many of the early cases when
it sought to expand its Section 13(b) power. In Federal Trade
Commission v. U.S. Oil & Gas Co., the court held that it had
the power to exercise traditional inherent powers of courts of
equity in FTC enforcement actions.20 The court also relied on
Porter in Federal Trade Commission v. H.N. Singer, Inc.,
where the Ninth Circuit held that it was entitled to use
equitable remedies outside the bounds of the statutory
language in FTC enforcement actions.21 The FTC also used
Mitchell to justify its use of disgorgement. In United States
v. Lane Labs–USA Inc., the court relied on Mitchell when it
held that district courts sitting in equity may grant
restitution unless there is a “clear statutory limitation” on
that power.22 And in Federal Trade Commission v. Cephalon,
Inc., the court accepted the FTC’s argument that Porter and
Mitchell established an analytical course for it to follow when
deciding on the limits of the FTC’s power.23 These cases show
that Porter and Mitchell form the foundation of the FTC’s use
of expansive equitable powers.
There are problems with the FTC’s reliance on Porter
and Mitchell. Porter is a 70-year-old case that deals with a
completely different statute and agency, and the FTC has
relied on it to grant itself a massive amount of power that
Congress did not specifically allow. There is a major
difference between the statute in Porter and Section 13(b) of
the FTC Act. The difference is that the FTC Act does not say
“or other order.” The FTC Act specifically gives the FTC the
right to seek injunctions from courts.24 It does not include a
catchall phrase like “or other order,” which is the key phrase
that allowed the Court in Porter to take such an expansive

20. 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984).
21. 668 F.2d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. 427 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2005).
23. 100 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2) (2018).
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view of which equitable remedies were available.25 And in
Mitchell, the Court agreed with the language from Porter
that stated equitable jurisdiction should not be limited
unless there is a “necessary and inescapable inference” in the
statutory language that would limit the court’s equitable
power.26 But Congress left out any mention of equitable
powers other than the two types of injunctions in Section
13(b).27 That leads to the inference that the only power
Congress intended for the FTC to have under that section
was the power to seek injunctions.
Another problem with using Porter as a legal foundation
is that the Supreme Court has rejected using analogies to
other statutory regimes when they are used in this way.28 In
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Court did not
rely on cases interpreting the Equal Pay Act when it was
deciding a question about Title VII.29 Its reasoning was
simply that the two statutes were not the same, so
analogizing one to the other did not do enough to answer the
legal question at hand.30 That is what the FTC and various
courts have done with their reliance on Porter and Mitchell.
Neither of those two cases dealt with anything even remotely
related to the FTC, but courts have consistently used the
interpretation of other statutes in those cases to interpret the
FTC Act.
If analogies to other statutory regimes are the proper
way to interpret Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, then the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.

25. 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946).
26. 361 U.S. at 291.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie, Inc., 976
F.3d 327, 379 (3rd. Cir. 2020) (holding that the FTC’s equitable powers under
Section 13(b) do not include disgorgement because the statute already “specifies
the form of equitable relief a court may order”).
28. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640 (2007).
29. See id.
30. Id.
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would provide a framework that is much more reasonable
and in line with basic rules of statutory interpretation. In
Meghrig, the Supreme Court held that a district court’s
equitable authority may be limited, even if the statute it is
interpreting does not expressly limit the court to certain
equitable remedies.31 The Court also stated that courts
should not assume other remedies are available when “a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies.”32 That contradicts the Porter-Mitchell line of
cases, which have been interpreted to say that if one
equitable remedy is available, then all of them are.
By the plain text of the statute, Congress only provided
for injunctive relief under Section 13(b). If Congress meant
for restitution and other forms of relief to be available under
Section 13(b), it would have specifically mentioned them.
This is seen in other sections of the very same statute, where
Congress did in fact describe the forms of relief available
beyond just injunctions. The other two enforcement
provisions that the FTC has at its disposal both use language
that describe other forms of equitable relief that are
available. Section 5 of the FTC Act states that “injunctions
and such other and further equitable relief as [district
courts] deem appropriate” are available.33 And in Section 19
of the FTC Act, the FTC is authorized to seek “the refund of
money or return of property.”34 There is no similar language
in Section 13(b). Congress specifically allowed other forms of
equitable relief under the other two enforcement provisions,
while limiting Section 13(b) to injunctions. This
misinterpretation of Section 13(b) allows the FTC to
circumvent the limitations of the other enforcement sections
while enjoying the benefits of the less restrictive Section
13(b). This point was raised in Credit Bureau Center, and it

31. See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487–88 (1996).
32. Id. at 488.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2018).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2018).
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is one of the main reasons why the Seventh Circuit court
ruled against the FTC in that case.35 The Seventh Circuit
relied on language from a recent Supreme Court case, which
stated that “[w]here Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”36 We must assume that Congress acted
intentionally when it used different wording in Section 13(b),
and that therefore it did not intend for anything besides
injunctions to be available under that section.
There are serious problems with the FTC’s and courts’
reliance on Porter and Mitchell. The cases are outdated, the
interpretation of the statute is flawed, and the legal
reasoning is stretched to the breaking point. When the
Supreme Court reviews this issue, it should rely on modern
cases that deal with the issue more directly, instead of
analogizing distantly related cases from decades ago.
C. Extensive Caselaw Contradicts the FTC’s Position
Besides the problems with the FTC’s reliance on Porter
and Mitchell, other cases have held that the FTC’s
interpretation of Section 13(b) is incorrect. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, L.C.C., the 7th Circuit
held that “[r]estitution isn’t an injunction.”37 This bare
statement of fact exposes the basic issue with the FTC’s
entire argument. And contrary to what the FTC would have
us believe, many courts agree with this simple and logical
assertion. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v.
Landstar System, Inc., the court stated that “[i]njunctive
relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable relief; it is not
an umbrella term that encompasses restitution or
35. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., L.L.C., 937 F.3d 764, 773
(7th Cir. 2019).
36. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009).
37. 937 F.3d 764, 771 (7th Cir. 2019).
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disgorgement.”38 The court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
held that an equitable order for backpay is not an injunction,
showing that all other forms of equitable relief are not
covered by the term injunction.39 And in Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Ass’n v. New Prime, Inc., the court
addressed this exact issue when it stated that disgorgement
does not qualify as injunctive relief.40
One other case that damages the FTC’s argument is the
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Liu v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, where, in considering the statute
that gives the SEC the ability to seek disgorgement, it noted
that when courts interpret a statute, they must give effect to
every clause and word of that statute.41 The corollary of that
basic rule of statutory interpretation is that courts must not
add words that are not there. When courts add their own
unstated ideas into statutes, they go beyond what the
judiciary is meant to do. These cases show that the FTC’s
argument is built on a shaky foundation that relies on two
old Supreme Court cases that might not even be decided the
same way if they were ruled on today. The FTC’s authority
to seek disgorgement is built on a house of cards that is ready
to topple at the first sign of a breeze.
The FTC should never have been granted power beyond
what Congress specifically enacted in the statute. Federal
agencies have no power to act in any way unless Congress
expressly confers power onto them.42 In the case of the FTC,
Congress gave it the power to seek preliminary and
permanent injunctions in the proper cases.43 But agencies

38. 622 F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010).
39. 564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011).
40. 213 F.R.D. 537, 545 (W.D. Mo. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2003).
41. See 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (2020).
42. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also Lyng
v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (“[A]n agency’s power is no greater than that
delegated to it by Congress.”).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).
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cannot assume that they have plenary authority to act in an
area just because Congress gave them some authority to act
in that area.44 That is precisely what the FTC has done. It
was given a specific amount of authority to seek injunctions
when the law is being violated or is about to be violated,45
and has aggressively expanded that authority to include a
whole range of equitable powers that Congress never
sanctioned. Now that the Supreme Court has taken up cases
on this issue, it seems increasingly likely that it will rule
against the FTC.
Many courts have brought up other glaring issues with
the FTC’s current enforcement scheme. Multiple cases have
noted that the FTC is authorized to act when wrongdoers are
violating or are about to violate the law, which would seem
to exclude enforcement actions based purely on past conduct.
But methods of restitution, such as disgorgement, are
definitionally based on past conduct. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., the court held that it
was “unambiguous” that “Section 13(b) does not permit the
FTC to bring a claim based on long-past conduct without
some evidence that the defendant ‘is’ committing or ‘is about
to’ commit another violation.”46 The court used the “plain
language” of Section 13(b) to show that the FTC does not
have the power it claims it does.47 The Seventh Circuit raised
this same argument in Credit Bureau Center, when it held
that methods of restitution “do[n’t] sit comfortably with the
text,” because injunctions are forward-facing, not backwardlooking.48 Black letter law also supports this argument.49 In
44. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 670
(D.C. Cir.), amended, 38 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
46. 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019).
47. Id.
48. 937 F.3d 764, 772 (7th Cir. 2019).
49. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2942, at 47 (3d ed. 2013) (stating that injunctive relief looks to the future); 1
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1), at 551 (2d ed. 1993) (defining restitution
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short, the FTC has twisted the very meaning of the word
injunction into something that has little basis in caselaw or
black letter law.
The FTC has demonstrated that it will use any means
necessary to expand its power beyond what Congress
intended. While it may believe that what it is doing is in the
best interests of the country, there are many cases where it
has reached far beyond its mission of protecting consumers,
to the point where it has worked against the interests of the
American public.
D. Examples of FTC Overreach
A recent case that is currently in litigation shows the
extent of the FTC’s overreach. Zurixx, LLC, was a company
that sold real estate and business education to consumers.
The company had met with FTC officials twice a year
through a Better Business Bureau trade organization called
the Electronic Retailers Self-Regulation Program (“ERSP”)
for well over five years. At these meetings, the company, as
well as other companies, asked the FTC for review and
guidance on compliance with federal trade regulations.
Rather than providing clear guidance, issuing a cease and
desist notice, or initiating an administrative hearing, as
called for in Sections 5 and 19 of the FTC, the FTC
purposefully side-stepped the due process requirements of
those applicable Sections of the Act and, instead, blind-sided
the company by bringing a sealed ex parte action under
Section 13(b).50 The FTC asserted that the company’s actions
posed an imminent harm to consumers, alleging that the
company overstated the potential benefits of the education
that the company offered and did not verbalize the company’s
full written guarantee during sales presentations.51
as a return of what the defendant gained in the transaction).
50. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Zurixx, L.L.C., No. 2:19-CV-00713, 2019 WL
7790890, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 2019).
51. Id. at *2.
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During the ex parte hearing, the FTC presented the
federal court in the District of Utah with a very one-sided,
skewed, and misleading set of “facts.” Taking the FTC at its
word, the court entered an FTC-penned ruling that Zurixx,
among other things, falsely represented the potential
earnings of consumers and that Zurixx understated the
amount of time and effort that consumers would need to
spend to earn money from their real estate training.52 The
array of heavy-handed enforcement methods that the FTC
was granted shows the problem with its current enforcement
scheme. Before the defendants were even given notice of the
action, the FTC obtained multiple forms of “equitable relief”
that do not necessarily fall under its statutory powers.53 The
court allowed the FTC to seize the bank accounts of the
company and its principals and use local law enforcement
offers to raid the company’s offices, copy all of the company’s
digital files and physical records, confiscate employee laptops
and cell phones, and detain employees for hours and
interview them with no attorneys present.54 The FTC then
issued a press release defaming the company and, through a
court-appointed monitor-turned-receiver, directed customers
to institute refunds of over $20 million. A company, and its
owners, that had diligently sought FTC guidance for over five
years was stunned, bankrupted, needlessly defamed, and out
of business before any semblance of due process was granted
them. The FTC has now moved on to seek even more
unlawful equitable relief, including rescission of contracts,
restitution, disgorgement, and damages. These FTC actions
take the statutory power permitting preliminary and
permanent injunctions and expands them to a level that
Congress never intended.
Zurixx submitted a motion to dismiss that was partially
based on the argument that Section 13(b) does not grant the

52. Id.
53. See generally infra Part II.
54. See Zurrix, L.L.C., 2019 WL 7790890, at *8–10.
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FTC the right to seek restitution.55 In denying the motion,
the court relied on the same set of cases that other courts
have recently declined to extend or overturned in their
respective jurisdictions. Zurixx argued that the plain
language of the FTC Act does not allow for relief other than
injunctive relief.56 It also pointed to the recent ruling in
Credit Bureau Center, which stated that “section 13(b) does
not authorize restitutionary relief.”57 The Tenth Circuit
declined to adopt the reasoning in Credit Bureau Center,
instead choosing to follow the Porter-Mitchell line of cases
and Federal Trade Commission v. Freecom Communications,
Inc.58 In Freecom, the Tenth Circuit held that Section 13(b)
grants the FTC the ability to seek the “full range of equitable
remedies.”59 By denying this motion, the Tenth Circuit
upheld the flawed precedent that the FTC relies on to the
detriment of business owners and employees.
The FTC now has different enforcement methods
available to it depending on what jurisdiction it is operating
in. Because of the ruling in Credit Bureau Center, businesses
in the Seventh Circuit are not subject to the range of
equitable remedies that the FTC has access to in other areas
of the country. This will cause a large amount of unfairness
in enforcement until the Supreme Court comes to a decision
on Credit Bureau Center. It means that some businesses will
be subject to the array of questionably legal equitable
remedies that the FTC is so quick to use in its enforcement
actions, and others will only be subject to the plain language
powers of Section 13(b). In order to have a fair, nationwide

55. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Zurixx, L.L.C., 441 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1220 (D.
Utah 2020), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 2:19CV713-DAK-EJF, 2020 WL
2043482 (D. Utah Apr. 28, 2020).
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., Inc., 937 F.3d 764,
767 (7th Cir. 2019)).
58. See id. at 1221.
59. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d
1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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enforcement scheme for the FTC, there needs to be
consistency in its powers. Thankfully, the Supreme Court is
now addressing this issue. But it is important that it acts
quickly to overturn the Porter-Mitchell line of cases so that
more businesses are not treated unfairly.
There are many other examples of the FTC going too far
in its enforcement actions and causing more harm than good.
In one representative case, the FTC raided a Florida
business called Vylah Tec, L.L.C. With the help of local
police, the FTC entered the business and told employees to
put their hands up and step away from their computers.60
The FTC confiscated the employees’ cell phones.61 The FTC
then detained the employees for hours and interviewed them
with no attorney present.62 A federal court granted the FTC
a preliminary injunction that appointed a receiver to control
the business.63 Because of the raid, the business was unable
to continue to operate. This caused a huge amount of
hardship for the business’s customers, employees, and the
owners of the business. This is the type of raid that
exemplifies the problem with the FTC’s current enforcement
scheme. If the FTC is not reined in by the Supreme Court,
these raids will continue to happen, and mistakes are
inevitable. If a raid like this happens to a business that is
later cleared of wrongdoing, the damage will be severe and
permanent, and innocent businesses should not be accepted
as casualties of FTC enforcement.
On several occasions, the extreme abuse of power that
the FTC engages in has resulted in the suicide of stunned

60. Robert Cupo, The FTC Raided My Office, Found Nothing, and Is
Destroying My Business Anyway, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:10
PM),
https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/the-ftc-raided-my-officefound-nothing-and-is-destroying-my-business-anyway/.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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business owners and executives.64 When FTC enforcement
actions result in the suicides of multiple business owners,
those actions are long overdue for a close inspection. Our
inspection of how the FTC interprets its ability to use Section
13(b) that goes far beyond its statutory meaning shows that
not only is the FTC improperly interpreting its statutory
powers, but that it is also time for the Supreme Court to
weigh in.
The Supreme Court needs to address this problem by
reining in the FTC’s enforcement powers back to what
Congress originally intended. Until the Supreme Court does
that, the FTC will continue to run wild and cause untold
amounts of damage to businesses and people across the
country.

64. The list of deceased includes, but is not limited to, Michael McLain Miller,
Russ Whitney, Jr., Don Lapre, and Chad Huntsman. See MOBE’s Russell
Whitney Dead, Susan Zanghi’s $318M Settlement, BEHIND MLM (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://behindmlm.com/companies/mobe/mobes-russell-whitney-dead-susanzanghis-318m-settlement/; Obituary of Chad S. Huntsman, LEGACY.COM,
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/name/chad-huntsman-obituary?pid=1745
98761 (last visited Nov. 11, 2020); Tom Harvey, Feds Sue Utah Companies,
Including a Swallow Donor, for Alleged Fraud, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2014,
5:01
PM),
https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=57577172&itype=cmsid;
Philip Caulfield, Don Lapre, TV Pitchman Accused of Fraud, Found Dead in
Arizona Jail Cell of Apparent Suicide, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 3, 2011, 8:19 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/don-lapre-tv-pitchman-accusedfraud-found-dead-arizona-jail-cell-apparent-suicide-article-1.959915; Obituary
of Michael McLain Miller, LEGACY.COM, https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/the
spectrum/obituary.aspx?n=mclain-miller&pid=179486062&fhid=18337
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2020).
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II. THE MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DISGORGEMENT AS
EQUITABLE RELIEF
A. History and Usage of Equitable Remedies
The power that the FTC was granted by Congress in
Section 13(b) is equitable in nature. The concept of equitable
relief in American law sprang from the types of relief that
were available under English Courts of Chancery.65 While
equity as a whole is difficult to define, there are some basic
principles that have guided the development of equitable
relief. Traditionally, equity served the purpose of remedying
defects in the common law, and it was applied in cases where
using the common law would have undesirable effects that
did not seem to fit the circumstances of the case.66 In general,
equitable remedies were used to avoid injustice that would
occur if the common law was used.67 They provided flexibility
in situations where fair administration of justice called for
it,68 and by doing so, equitable remedies have and will
continue to serve an important purpose in the American
common-law system.
When founded, many states in the United States
maintained separate courts of equity modeled after the
English system.69 Courts of law and equity were separate
until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938.70 Now, in most states, there is no distinction between
courts, and the same courts and judges apply both law and

65. See Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24–25 (1951).
66. See id. at 24.
67. See id. at 25.
68. See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV.
530, 568–71 (2016).
69. See id. at 537.
70. See id. at 538; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988) (“[T]he merger of law and equity . . . was accomplished
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”).
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equity.71 Although there has been significant overlap
between the two types of law, the system of equitable
remedies has stayed separate from legal remedies. One
reason for this is the irreparable injury rule, which states
that plaintiffs may not seek equitable remedies if a legal
remedy would be adequate.72 Although precisely defining
whether a legal remedy is adequate has been the subject of
extensive debate, this rule is the basic dividing line between
equitable and legal remedies.
In modern American law, the use of equitable remedies
is based on their traditional, historical use. Courts acting in
equity have access to a few different types of equitable
remedies. The classic equitable remedies that courts use are
injunctions, accounting for profits, constructive trust,
equitable
liens,
subrogation,
equitable
rescission,
73
reformation, and specific performance. Injunctions allow
courts to prohibit the defendant from taking certain actions,
or require the defendant to take certain actions.74 Courts
grant preliminary injunctions before a case is litigated in full
in order to preserve the status quo,75 and permanent
injunctions are given after the merits of the case have been
decided.76 Courts apply four factors when deciding whether
to grant a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant
will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction,
(2) the movant’s likelihood of success, (3) the balance
between the harm to the movant and the harm to the

71. See Bray, supra note 68, at 538.
72. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687, 689 (1990).
73. See Bray, supra note 68, at 553–57.
74. Id. at 553; see also Nat’l Compressed Steel Corp. v. Unified Gov’t of
Wyandotte Cty./Kansas City, 38 P.3d 723, 729 (Kan. 2002) (“An injunction is an
equitable remedy . . . prohibiting or commanding certain acts.”).
75. See Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (describing the
purpose of preliminary injunctions as to “preserve the relative positions of the
parties until a trial on the merits can be held”).
76. Bray, supra note 68, at 553.
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nonmovant, and (4) the public interest.”77
For the purposes of this Article, injunctions will be the
most important category of equitable relief to consider,
because the under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC is
entitled to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions.78
Nothing in the history of equitable remedies or the history of
injunctions supports the FTC’s position that it should have
the power to seek disgorgement when the statute only grants
it the power to seek injunctions.
B. The FTC’s Misuse of Equitable Relief
The FTC has characterized its practice of seeking
disgorgement as an equitable remedy that falls under its
statutory power to seek preliminary and permanent
injunctions.79 The way that disgorgement is used by the FTC
does not fit with the traditional view of equity. Both
traditional views and usages of equity, as well as case law
spanning hundreds of years, prove disgorgement, as used by
the FTC, is not allowed by the statute that grants the agency
power.
Equitable remedies are limited to those categories of
relief that have traditionally been available in equity. Those
remedies are the ones that were available “during the days
of the divided bench,” or the time before courts of law and
courts of equity merged.80 In Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson, the Supreme Court held the relief
that the plaintiffs sought was legal, not equitable, because
the funds at issue were not in the possession of the

77. Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1522–23
(2011).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2) (2018).
79. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Liu, 754 F. App’x 505, 509 (9th Cir.
2018).
80. Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan,
136 S. Ct. 651, 657 (2016).
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defendants.81 This would apply to many different FTC
enforcement actions because the FTC often seeks to take
back any and all money that was gained through the
wrongdoing, even if it is no longer in the possession of the
defendant. If the FTC does that, that makes it more of a legal
remedy, not an equitable remedy, and it therefore does not
have the power to seek it.
The FTC’s use of disgorgement does not fit within the
traditional view of equity because it is punitive. One of the
main features of equity is that it should bring the situation
back into balance, not punish one party or another. Courts
have always tried to treat equity as “a court of conscience, . . .
not a forum of vengeance.”82 Equity “permits only what is
just and right with no element of vengeance or punishment
. . . .”83 Courts of law are supposed to be where punishment
is meted out by the court system; the function of courts of
equity is not to administer punishment.84 Most recently, the
Supreme Court affirmed that this remains the law, when in
Liu, it held that a wrongdoer “should not be punished by
‘pay[ing] more than a fair compensation to the person
wronged.’”85 This is the traditional view of equity in
American courts, and the FTC’s use of disgorgement does not
fit within that view, because it goes beyond fair
compensation and is really just a form of punishment.
Disgorgement is a modern term that has no history in
courts of equity.86 Unlike other monetary remedies with long
histories in courts of equity, such as constructive trust or
81. See 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
82. Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
83. Williamson v. Chi. Mill & Lumber Corp., 59 F.2d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 1932).
84. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S.
703, 717–18 n.14 (1974).
85. 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1943 (2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Tilghman v.
Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 145–46 (1888)).
86. See Thomas C. Mira, The Measure of Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement
Actions Against Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 445
(1985).
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equitable liens, disgorgement is a modern invention never
used by Courts of Chancery. As the Court stated in Kokesh,
disgorgement is imposed for “punitive purposes.”87 Because
the availability of equitable remedies is based on their
historical and traditional use in our legal system, courts
cannot create new remedies, especially when they go against
the fundamental rule that equitable remedies should not be
punitive.
Case law also supports the argument that the FTC is
misusing its ability to seek equitable remedies. In Liu, the
Liu family challenged the SEC’s ability to seek
disgorgement, and the Supreme Court dealt the SEC a major
blow. Although this case dealt with the SEC and not the FTC,
the SEC uses disgorgement in much the same way as the
FTC does, and it is a dispositive case for the practice of
disgorgement among government agencies. The backdrop of
the case was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kokesh v.
Securities & Exchange Commission, which stated that
disgorgement operates as a “penalty.”88 In Kokesh, the
Supreme Court also included a footnote that intimated that
courts had not properly applied disgorgement principles in
the context of SEC enforcement actions.89 That led to Liu,
which challenged the SEC’s enforcement methods and finally
made its way to the Supreme Court three years later. In Liu,
the Court held that disgorgement awards must not exceed a
wrongdoer’s net profits, effectively making business
expenses deductible from the amount of the disgorgement.90
The SEC sought disgorgement that would equal the full
amount of money that the defendants had raised in the
course of their business.91 The Court found that to be beyond

87. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017).
88. Id. at 1642 (stating that a penalty is something that deters others from
offending in a like manner and does not simply compensate victims for their loss).
89. See id. at n.3.
90. See 140 S. Ct. at 1940.
91. Id. at 1942.
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what an equitable remedy should allow.92
In its analysis, the Court asked whether the remedy of
disgorgement fell into “those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity.”93 This is the how the Court has
traditionally determined whether a particular type of relief
is equitable relief.94 The Court’s analysis showed that there
are two principles that equitable remedies must follow. First,
equity authorizes courts to take back ill-gotten gains, and
second, equitable remedies must not merge with legal
remedies by being punitive.95 The Court also noted that
“disgorgement of improper profits” was how courts
traditionally applied equitable remedies.96 However, that
does not give the FTC unlimited power to seek restitution.
The SEC is granted the right to seek equitable remedies in
the statute granting it power,97 but the FTC is only granted
the right to seek injunctions.98 This case will have a huge
impact on the FTC’s ability to seek disgorgement, and the
amount of disgorgement it will be able to seek. By affirming
that equitable remedies must not be punitive, and that they
must be limited to net profits only, defendants in FTC
enforcement actions can argue the disgorgement the FTC
seeks is illegal under Liu.
Other cases also support the argument that the FTC has
gone further than its statutory power allows. In Credit
Bureau Center, the court stated that “[r]estitution isn’t an
injunction” and that “statutory authorizations for
injunctions don’t encompass other discrete forms of equitable

92. Id. at 1940.
93. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248, 256 (1993)).
94. See, e.g., CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011).
95. Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942.
96. Id. at 1943 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481
U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018).
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).
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relief like restitution.”99 In that case, the FTC argued that
the statute implicitly authorizes restitution. But the court
disagreed with that argument because the statute grants the
FTC the right to seek injunctions against defendants who are
violating or about to violate the law.100 Seeking restitution
against defendants does not fit within that power because
the power is forward-looking, not backward-looking.
Restitution is about taking back what was wrongfully
gained, not preventing further violations of the law.
Disgorgement, as currently used by the FTC, bears the
same “hallmarks of a penalty” that the Court described in
Kokesh.101 And when a remedy is a penalty, it cannot be an
equitable remedy, because punishment is not the job of
courts of equity.102 Although courts have acknowledged that
equity is a flexible concept, that “flexibility is confined within
the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.”103
Accordingly, courts cannot make up new equitable remedies
or start using legal remedies and call them equitable
remedies.104 The system of equity in this country has always
been based on the traditional remedies used by English
Courts of Chancery, and expansion of those remedies merges
the law of equitable remedies with legal remedies, which the
Supreme Court has sought to avoid many times.105 To keep
with the tradition of equitable remedies in this country, and
be consistent with our reading of cases and statutes, the

99. 937 F.3d 764, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2019).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
101. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
102. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417
U.S. 703, 717–18 n.14 (1974).
103. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
322 (1999).
104. See id. at 321 (stating that courts cannot make up new forms of equitable
relief to serve “the grand aims of equity”).
105. For example, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534
U.S. 204, 209 (2002), the Court affirmed that equitable relief must mean
something less than all relief.
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FTC’s power to seek disgorgement must be curtailed.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH FTC ENFORCEMENT
METHODS
A. The FTC Avoids Jury Trials by Using Section 13(b)
There are also constitutional problems with the FTC’s
enforcement scheme. The FTC strategically picks which
enforcement methods to use in order to avoid giving
defendants the option of having a jury trial. The Seventh
Amendment guarantees defendants the right to a jury
trial.106 Specifically, it states that “[i]n Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”107 The
importance of this fundamental right in the American legal
system cannot be overstated. The right to a jury trial has
always given defendants the chance to argue their cases in
front of normal citizens instead of a judge. This allows
defendants to have their cases decided by normal people, who
are not so constrained by stare decisis and judicial
momentum that they cannot take a detached look at what is
actually going on in the case. When the FTC strategically
takes that opportunity away from a defendant, it takes away
one of the basic rights of defendants in the American legal
system.
The FTC avoids jury trials by only seeking what it argues
are equitable remedies. The Seventh Amendment only
extends to cases where “legal rights” are at issue, not “those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered . . . .”108 Therefore, when the
court is acting in equity, defendants do not have a right to a
jury trial. Courts have concluded that this rule applies to
Section 13(b) enforcement actions. For example, in Federal

106. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
107. Id.
108. Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830).
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Trade Commission v. ELH Consulting, L.L.C., the court held
that because the FTC sought “relief based on the court’s
equitable powers,” the defendants had no right to a jury
trial.109 The FTC takes full advantage of this aspect of
Section 13(b) to skirt the requirements of the Seventh
Amendment, making sure that defendants have only the
most limited options in their cases.
The problem with this strategy is that the actual
enforcement methods in Section 13(b) have more in common
with legal remedies than equitable remedies.110 This gives
the FTC an advantage because it gets to use powerful
remedies that seem like legal remedies without having to
fight and win a verdict from a jury trial. On the other hand,
if the FTC were to use Section 19 of the FTC Act, defendants
would have the right to a jury trial because Section 19
contains legal remedies. And if the case involved both legal
and equitable claims, then the legal claims could be tried to
a jury first, followed by the rest of the case being tried by a
judge.111 The FTC has purposefully arranged a system where
defendants are as disadvantaged as possible. If courts
continue to allow the FTC to use these so-called equitable
remedies in its enforcement actions, then defendants will not
have access to the rights guaranteed to them in the
Constitution.
B. Restitution Under Section 13(b) Violates the Eighth
Amendment
The FTC frequently uses Section 13(b) to impose massive
fines on businesses,112 a practice which is in violation of the
109. No. CV 12-02246-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 593885, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7,
2013); see also Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 962 (9th Cir. 2001)
(observing that there is no right to a jury for equitable claims).
110. See supra Part II.
111. See Colo. Visionary Acad. v. Medtronic, Inc., 397 F.3d 867, 875 (10th Cir.
2005).
112. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Publishers Bus. Servs., Inc., No. 2:08–cv–
00620–APG–GWF, 2017 WL 451953, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2017) (upholding a
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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. The
Eighth Amendment provides protection against excessive
fines imposed by the government.113 The main goal of the
Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is to ensure that
the amount of forfeiture is proportional to the gravity of the
offense.114 If the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the
offense, then it is in violation of the Eighth Amendment.115
There are many examples of the FTC violating this principle
by imposing huge fines on businesses that are far out of
proportion with the offense.
In U.S. Department of Justice v. Daniel Chapter One, the
court refused to consider the defendants’ argument that the
restitution the FTC sought violated the Eighth Amendment,
because the defendants failed to show the penalty was
punitive and disproportionate.116 The court stated that,
because the defendants raised the issue in a cursory fashion,
the court would decline to resolve it.117 From this case, we
can conclude that courts require defendants to show two
factors when making an argument under the Excessive Fines
Clause: the payment is punitive and it is disproportionate
with the offense. Many of the judgments that defendants in
Section 13(b) cases have to pay satisfy both of these
requirements.
The disgorgement that the FTC frequently seeks
constitutes a fine under the Eighth Amendment. A statutory
forfeiture is a fine under the Eighth Amendment if it is a
punishment.118 Forfeitures that are “nonpunitive” do not fall

$24 million disgorgement payment).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
114. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
115. See id.
116. 89 F. Supp. 3d 132, 154–55 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 20 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
117. Id. at 155.
118. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n.6.
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under the Eighth Amendment.119 In Kokesh, the Court
established that disgorgement, as used by the SEC, bore “all
the hallmarks of a penalty.”120 This was because
disgorgement is imposed with the intent to deter future
conduct, not to compensate for the wrongdoing that was
already committed.121 The FTC uses disgorgement in much
the same way as the SEC. The FTC imposes massive fines on
businesses that do more than remedy past wrongs. The fines
are warnings to other businesses to not repeat the behavior,
and the FTC seeks to make the fines as high as possible to
further that goal. Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Kokesh, that makes the fines a punishment, not a remedial
measure.
Some of the fines that the FTC imposes are vastly
disproportional to the offense that it seeks to punish. After
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Liu, it is established law that
disgorgement payments that exceed net profits are not
allowed.122 Even though that case dealt with the SEC and
not the FTC, the same principle should apply because
disgorgement as used by the FTC is functionally the same as
when it is used by the SEC. However, the FTC has
continually sought disgorgement payments that far exceed
the net profits acquired in the course of the wrongdoing. That
makes the disgorgement disproportionate because it goes
beyond taking back the money that was gained by the
wrongful scheme.
The FTC’s use of disgorgement in Section 13(b)
enforcement actions violates the Eighth Amendment. The
imposed fines are grossly disproportionate to the crimes they
seek to remedy, and there is an intention to punish the
businesses instead of simply returning the parties to the
status quo. The FTC cannot be allowed to continue levying
119. See id.
120. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
121. Id.
122. See 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1949–50 (2020).
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these unconstitutional fines on businesses. The effect is
businesses being destroyed without the protections that they
have the right to under the Constitution. Of course,
consumers should be protected, but violating the Eighth
Amendment is not the best way to achieve that goal.
C. The FTC’s Use of Receivers is Contrary to the Intention of
the Fourth Amendment
The FTC uses receivers to avoid the requirement of
obtaining a search warrant before gaining access to
materials and information belonging to defendants. The
Fourth
Amendment
provides
protection
against
123
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, when the
FTC appoints a receiver in a case, that receiver can demand
businesses to turn over information without the normal
procedural protections that go along with obtaining a proper
search warrant. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
established that people and businesses under investigation
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.124 The general rule
is that when a person has a subjective expectation of privacy,
and society would recognize that expectation as reasonable
(the objective requirement), then a search warrant is
required to search that location.125 The FTC gets around that
rule by appointing receivers, who can then demand materials
from businesses without having to go through the formal
process of obtaining a search warrant.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Pointbreak Media,
L.L.C., the FTC acquired laptops and other electronically
stored information by way of a receiver, thereby avoiding any
Fourth Amendment protections that would come with
getting a search warrant.126 The court denied the defendants’
arguments that a search warrant was necessary because the
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
124. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
125. See id.
126. 343 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
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evidence submitted by the FTC constituted probable cause
for the seizure of the materials.127 But that goes against the
intention and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the
FTC takes full advantage of that. The FTC is able to simply
present its evidence, and when a receiver is appointed, it
essentially acts as a general search warrant for every asset
of the business.
General search warrants violate the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In Groh v. Ramirez,
the Supreme Court held that any search warrant must state
the particular items that are going to be seized.128 And in
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Court affirmed that a
warrant that does not follow the particularity requirement is
unconstitutional.129 But when the FTC is able to appoint a
receiver, it has access to all the assets of the business and
can search them at will. Indeed, the “central purpose” of
appointing a receiver is the seizure of all assets.130 There is
never any statement of which particular items are going to
be searched. Appointing a receiver has the opposite effect. It
allows the FTC to access any and all assets of the business
without having to explain why those particular items are
subject to search and seizure. This does not square with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The FTC’s use of receivers to seize assets acts as a
general warrant and is clearly in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. This type of behavior is contrary to the basic
intention of the Fourth Amendment, which is to protect
defendants from wide-ranging searches that are
unsupported by evidence against them. Appointing receivers
allows the FTC to go fishing for any possible evidence against
the defendants, and the defendants do not have the
opportunity to defend themselves from it. The FTC’s use of
127. Id.
128. 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).
129. 468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5 (1984).
130. United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 488 (5th Cir. 2009).
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this strategy further shows that there is a pattern of avoiding
procedural protections and using loopholes in order to
destroy businesses’ opportunities to defend themselves.
CONCLUSION
The FTC’s power has grown to an unacceptable and
lethal level. When the Supreme Court addresses this issue,
it will have the chance to bring the FTC’s enforcement
powers back to what Congress intended. And it looks likely
that it will. After the decisions in Kokesh and Liu, the
Supreme Court has shown that it agrees with reducing the
power that federal agencies have when it comes to using
disgorgement as an enforcement method. With those
recently decided cases setting the tone of the Supreme Court,
it seems likely that the Court will follow the lead of the
Seventh Circuit in Credit Bureau Center and bring the FTC’s
power back into line with the original meaning of the statute.
The FTC should never have been allowed to have
disgorgement in its arsenal of enforcement methods. It
initially gained the ability to seek disgorgement by relying
on old and inapposite caselaw. It then worked to build a
foundation of precedential cases that courts had little choice
but to follow. The FTC reconstructed the entire meaning of
the statutory language and redefined what equitable relief
means to suit its own purposes. Its use of disgorgement has
strayed so far from traditional equitable remedies that it is
not recognizable as equitable any longer. And during this
process, the FTC has infringed on, or found loopholes around,
multiple constitutional rights. This slippery slope of stronger
and stronger enforcement methods has had a terrible effect
on businesses and people around the country.
The damage that has been caused to businesses and
private citizens of this country by the FTC’s overreach is
hard to quantify. But it has been far too high of a cost for the
benefit that the country has received in return. The FTC lost
sight of its purpose in its quest to expand its power to its
current level, and the only thing that can stop this out-of-
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control process is for the Supreme Court to make the right
decision and limit the FTC’s enforcement power.

